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Abstract 
The principal aim of this article is to explain the specificity of the requirement for a spatial 
distribution of votes in presidential elections – an institution that has existed in Nigeria since 
1979 and in Indonesia since 2001. It also seeks to describe the political conditions which 
contributed to that institution’s introduction and functioning in those two countries. The 
article will end with a comparison between the two cases, including a discussion of the 
present differences between them. The article will also contain a preliminary appraisal of 
whether the existence of the requirement in question is helping to reduce the level of 
conflictive behaviour in relations between ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic societies of 
Nigeria and Indonesia. 
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1. Introduction  
In the Nigerian and Indonesian political systems, often referred to as 
centripetal systems,2 the candidate for the presidential office who has 
obtained the greatest number of votes must satisfy a constitutionally 
mandated spatial distribution of those votes, i.e., to secure a minimal 
                                                          
* Center for the Research on Multiethnic Societies, Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental 
Cultures, Polish Academy of Sciences, e-mail: krzysztoftrzcinski@tlen.pl. 
1  This article was written as part of project no. 2014/15/B/HS5/01174, entitled 
Centripetalism as a Model of Political System for Multi-Ethnic States: Comparative 
Analysis of Two Cases, financed by the National Science Centre, Poland. 
2 For more on this subject, see Krzysztof Trzciński, ‘Centrypetalizm – integrujący system 
polityczny dla państw wieloetnicznych. Zarys teorii empirycznej’ [‘Centripetalism – An 
Integrative Political System for Multiethnic Countries: An Outline of the Empirical 
Theory’], Studia Polityczne [Political Studies], Vol. 39, No. 3, 2015, pp. 183–213. 
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measure of support, defined in percentage terms, in a significant number 
of basic units of territorial division: a minimum of 25% of votes cast in at 
least 2/3 of all states (in the case of Nigeria) or at least 20% of votes in 
half of all provinces (in the case of Indonesia). In addition to those two 
countries, the institution of centripetalism exists only in Kenya.3 This 
requirement is intended to make electoral victory easier to attain for those 
candidates whose views and political acts (especially in questions that are 
sensitive for individual ethnic groups), are of a moderate character and 
which serve in multi-segmental (especially multi-ethnic) societies to build 
and maintain good relations between ethnic segments. As has been noted 
by Donald L. Horowitz, the leading scholar and expert on political 
problems of multi-segmental societies,4 the requirement of attaining a 
spatial distribution of votes in presidential elections is an example of an 
arrangement helping segments represented by politicians to exhibit non-
conflicting or less-conflicting behaviour with regard to one another.  
The requirement of attaining a spatial distribution of votes in 
presidential elections is recognized as an institution of the power-sharing 
type and, more specifically, of its centripetal model (also called 
“integrative power-sharing”). Two models of inter-segmental (especially 
inter-ethnic) power-sharing are distinguished and opposed to each other 
in the abundant literature on the subject: consociationalism and 
centripetalism.5 Thus far, centripetalism has been fully implemented only 
in Nigeria and Indonesia. Centripetalism presupposes the possibility of 
political integration of the groups’ elites above segmental (especially 
ethnic) divisions, thus weakening the importance of the latter. 
                                                          
3 The present article is based on an earlier one published in Polish (Krzysztof Trzciński, 
‘Wymóg uzyskania terytorialnego rozłożenia głosów (poparcia) w wyborach 
prezydenckich’ [‘Spatial Vote Distribution Requirement in Presidential Elections’], 
Athenaeum, Vol. 49, 2016, pp. 113–137), which contains, among other things, a discussion 
of the case of Kenya, but which does not examine the requirement in question in the context 
of centripetalism and power-sharing. 
4 D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 
p. 647. 
5 T.D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, Washington 
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996; D.L. Horowitz, ‘Ethnic Power Sharing: Three 
Big Problems’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 5–20; S. Wolff, 
‘Consociationalism, Power Sharing, and Politics at the Center’ in The International Studies 
Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, R.A. Denemark (ed.), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 535–556; 
B. Reilly, Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007; M. Basedau, ‘Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Menu of 
Institutional Engineering’, GIGA Working Papers, Issue 171, 2011, pp. 1–29. 
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Centripetalism by definition promotes ethnically neutral legal practices 
concerning the status of individuals and groups in multi-segmental 
conditions – something that is supposed to strengthen the process of 
integration, the reaching of which is the purpose of centripetal 
institutions. Empirical centripetalism (Nigerian and Indonesian) is made 
up of the following institutional arrangements: 6  a territorial structure 
within the framework of which large ethnic groups are “broken down” so 
their members live in distinct, preferably multi-ethnic territorial and 
administrative units – something that is supposed make the elites of one 
and the same large group representing various regions compete with each 
other, for example for funds from the central budget; supra-regional and 
inter-ethnic political parties required to form ethnically heterogeneous 
lists of candidates in different elections; and the constitutional 
requirement for candidates in presidential elections to obtain a spatial 
distribution of votes, the fulfillment of which is necessary to assume the 
office of president.7 
The principal aim of this article is to explain the specificity of the 
requirement for a spatial distribution of votes in presidential elections – 
an institution that has existed in Nigeria since 1979 and in Indonesia since 
2001. It also seeks to describe the political conditions which contributed 
to that institution’s introduction and functioning in those two countries. 
The article will end with a comparison between the two cases, including 
a discussion of the present differences between them. The article will also 
                                                          
6 Reilly, Democracy and Diversity…, pp. 83–91; B. Reilly, ‘Centripetalism’ in Routledge 
Handbook of Ethnic Conflict, K. Cordell and S. Wolff (eds), London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 
291–295; B. Reilly, ‘Centripetalism: Cooperation, Accommodation, and Integration’ in 
Conflict Management in Divided Societies: Theories and Practice, S. Wolff and Ch. 
Yakinthou (eds), New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 57–64. 
7 The fourth element of centripetalism is mentioned in the literature – the use of so-called 
preferential voting, in the form of either a single transferable vote or an alternative vote, in 
parliamentary elections (especially to the lower chamber). Such voting, through the ranking 
of candidates, makes it possible for voters to indicate preferences among candidates of 
different parties. In the case of centripetalism, the aim of such voting would be to reduce 
chances of the election to parliament of politicians showing little restraint in their political 
views and actions, particularly with regard to inter-segmental relations. Preferential voting 
systems functioned for a time in Sri Lanka, Fiji and in Papua New Guinea, among other 
places. See Reilly, Democracy and Diversity…, pp. 115–118; A. McCulloch, ‘Does 
Moderation Pay? Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Societies’, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 12, No. 
2, 2013, pp. 111–132; A. McCulloch, ‘The Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply 
Divided Places’ in Power-Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, J. McEvoy and B. O’Leary 
(eds), Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, pp. 94–111. 
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contain a preliminary appraisal of whether the existence of the 
requirement in question is helping to reduce the level of conflictive 
behaviour in relations between ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic societies 
of Nigeria and Indonesia.  
 
2. The context of the introduction of the requirement for a spatial 
distribution of votes in the presidential elections in Nigeria and 
Indonesia 
Before explaining what the institution of the requirement for a spatial 
distribution of votes in presidential elections consists of, the specific 
political conditions in Nigeria and Indonesia that have contributed to that 
institution’s introduction and functioning must be identified.  
 
2.1. Nigeria and its political situation 
Nigeria is the most important state on the African continent, given the 
size of its economy,8 and also the most populous. Its population reached 
about 192 million in 2017, according to estimates, and this makes it the 
world’s seventh most populous state.9 Nigeria is also a vast country with 
an area of nearly 924,000 km2. It is inhabited by members of about 25010 
ethnic groups,11 the largest of which are the Hausa-Fulani (about 29% of 
Nigeria’s population), the Yoruba (about 21%), Igbo (about 18%) and the 
                                                          
8 According to the estimates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Nigeria’s nominal 
GDP in 2016 amounted to about 405 billion USD, which made this country the world’s 27th 
largest economy and the largest in Africa. See International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database, Washington DC, October 2017:  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/weorept.aspx (accessed 
29.11.2017). 
9 Worldometers, Population in 2017: Nigeria: http://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/nigeria-population (accessed 14.11.2017). 
10 Encyclopedia of the Nations, Nigeria: 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria.html (accessed 
10.10.2017). 
11 The term “ethnic group” is understood by the author as a group of people who see 
themselves as a distinct cultural community; who often share a common language, religion, 
kinship, and/or physical characteristics (such as skin color); and who tend to harbor negative 
and hostile feelings toward members of other ethnic groups, as defined in A. Lijphart, 
‘Multiethnic Democracy’ in The Encyclopedia of Democracy, Vol. 3, S.M. Lipset (ed.), 
London: Routledge, 1995, p. 853. 
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Ijaw (about 10%).12 As many as 522 languages are spoken in Nigeria,13 
although the sole official language is English. It is estimated that about 
50% of Nigeria’s inhabitants are Muslims, who live mainly in the north 
of the country, while Christians make up 40% of the population and live 
mostly in the south of the country.14 About 10% of Nigerians follow 
indigenous beliefs.15 
After gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria functioned as a 
federation of three regions: The North (dominated by the mostly Muslim 
Hausa-Fulani), the West (dominated by the mostly Christian Yoruba) and 
the East (dominated by the mostly Christian Igbo). Even though in each 
region one ethnic group was predominant, all were inhabited by many 
smaller groups. The three largest groups had their own ethnic parties, 
which competed aggressively with each other at the central government 
level. As a result, the newly established Nigerian state with a multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious society became subject to serious tensions almost 
from the outset. At the root of such tensions also lay clear cultural 
differences, especially those setting apart Muslims and Christians; the 
question of the division of budget revenues, which in large measure 
originated from the exploitation of oil fields of the Niger Delta; and 
problems related to the different political traditions of the main ethnic 
groups and the difficulty of reconciling them for the purpose of running 
an independent state. 
Tensions erupted in the second half of the 1960s, when the army began 
to play a decisive role in Nigerian politics. In January 1966, during an 
unsuccessful military coup conducted mainly by the Igbo, a considerable 
proportion of Nigeria’s leading politicians, public functionaries, and high-
ranking officers from the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba ethnic groups were 
killed. As a result of the complicated political situation that followed the 
attempted coup and the ensuing persecutions of the Igbo, especially by 
the Hausa-Fulani, in 1967 the Igbo proclaimed the secession of the oil 
rich Eastern Region and the establishment on its territory of the 
                                                          
12 Index Mundi, Nigeria Demographics Profile 2017: 
https://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html (accessed 29.11.2017). 
13 Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Nigeria: http://www.ethnologue.com/country/NG 
(accessed 10.10.2017). 
14 Index Mundi, Nigeria Demographics Profile… 
15 Ibidem. 
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independent Republic of Biafra,16 which was then attacked by the federal 
forces of Nigeria, now ruled by a military junta (established as a result of 
a coup in July 1966). 
From 1967 to 1970 the country was embroiled in a civil war, the so-
called Biafra War,17 which, according to most sources, cost the lives of 
over one million people. The Christian Igbo were opposed by the mostly 
Muslim Hausa-Fulani and the mostly Christian Yoruba. The Biafra War 
had the characteristics of an ethnic conflict.18 After the end of the war, 
which the federal side won, the political situation in Nigeria gradually 
stabilized, something that certain experts saw as being due mainly to the 
introduction in that country of the institutions of a centripetal political 
system.19  
The emergence of centripetalism in Nigeria did not prevent the 
breakout of all conflicts. These were, however, of a lesser scale than the 
Biafra War and were not strictly ethnic in character. The most serious 
present conflict in Nigeria is the ongoing revolt of the extremist Muslim 
organization Boko Haram (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad), 
which is directed against the Nigerian authorities, against Christians, and 
against those Muslims who tolerate Western influences above all in 
education, science, administration and the political system. Another 
important conflict, one whose intensity has decreased recently, has been 
going on since the 1990s in the Niger River delta: The members of mostly 
two ethnic groups inhabiting this area, the Ijaw and the Ogoni, organized 
in a number of armed organizations, are opposed to, in the words of their 
leaders, economic exploitation by the central government. This conflict, 
however, has its own specific character because the direct targets of the 
attacks by the Niger River delta rebels are not so much the forces of the 
                                                          
16 The Biafra Republic, with its capital in Enugu, was recognized by only 5 states and existed 
formally until 1970. 
17  See, for example, R. Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of 
Authority and Revolt 1960–67, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 298–
340. 
18 The notion of “ethnic conflict” (also “interethnic conflict”) is understood by the author as 
defined by Errol A. Henderson, as a dispute between rival groups, which identify themselves 
mainly in terms of ethnic criteria (i.e., connected with such common traits as 
ethnicity/nationality, language, religion and race), and which raise group claims to resources 
on the basis of their group rights. See E.A. Henderson, ‘Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation’ in 
Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Vol. 1, L. Kurtz (ed.), San Diego: Academic 
Press, 1999, p. 751. 
19 See, for example, Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict…, pp. 612–613. 
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Nigerian state, but the workers and the installations of Western companies 
extracting oil and gas in the Niger River delta. Still, by targeting the 
petroleum industry, the rebels are reducing Nigeria’s budget revenues, 
80% of which, according to the Nigerian political scientist Rotimi T. 
Suberu,20 derive from various taxes and levies paid by entities exploiting 
the resources of the Niger River delta. At least 13% of those revenues 
should be returned to several southern states where such resources are 
extracted. Considering the very high degree of corruption in Nigeria, 
however, the transfer of those funds to the authorities of the Niger River 
delta states does not necessarily mean they are spent rationally for the 
benefit of the local population. 
 
2.2. Indonesia and its political situation  
Indonesia, independent since 1945, is the world's fourth most 
populous country, with a population of about 265 million inhabitants in 
2017.21 The Indonesian economy is one of the world's largest.22 Indonesia 
occupies an area of almost 2 million km2, and its territory on the equatorial 
axis extends over 5,000 km. The country is made up of about 17,000 
islands, over 6,000 of which are inhabited. Unique cultures have emerged 
on many Indonesian islands. Indonesian society is very divided ethnically 
and, to a lesser degree, also religiously. According to data from 2010, the 
largest ethnic group in Indonesia are the Javanese (a little over 40% of the 
entire population), followed by the Sundanese (approx. 15.5%), the Malay 
(approx. 3.7%), the Batak (approx. 3.6%) and the Madurese (approx. 
3%).23 The share of any of the several hundred other native ethnic groups 
                                                          
20  R.T. Suberu, ‘Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian 
Experience’ in Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective, 
D. Turton (ed.), Oxford: James Currey, 2006, pp. 75–76. 
21  Worldometers, Population in 2017, Indonesia: http://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/indonesia-population/ (accessed 10.10.2017). 
22 Indonesia’s nominal GDP in 2016 was approx. $932 billion, making the country the 5th 
largest economy in Asia and the 16th in the world. See International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database, Washington DC, October 2017: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/weorept.aspx (accessed 
29.11.2017). 
23 A. Ananta, E. N. Arifin, M. S. Hasbullah, N. B. Handayani, and A. Pramono, Changing 
Ethnic Composition: Indonesia, 2000–2010, 2013:   
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.693.2147&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(accessed 11.10.2017). 
Index Mundi, Indonesia Demographics Profile 2017: 
https://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/demographics_profile.html (accessed 12.10.2017). 
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in Indonesia's population is under 3%. Among the immigrant population, 
the most numerous are the Chinese (approx. 1.2%). According to data 
from 2010, the vast majority of Indonesians, approx. 87%, are Muslim 
(overwhelmingly Sunni); the number of Christians (Protestants and 
Catholics) is just under 10%; and Hindus represent approx. 1.7%.24 
The introduction during the democratization wave in 1998–2002 of 
institutions which are typical of inter-segmental power-sharing systems 
was determined by at least two basic factors. Firstly, the smaller ethnic 
groups feared that the Javanese’s politically and economically superior 
position would be used against their interests in the state. As is shown by 
Donald L. Horowitz,25 certain electoral systems could give the inhabitants 
of Java or the ethnic Javanese, a sufficient number of votes to enable them 
to single-handedly elect the president of Indonesia. Smaller ethnic 
groups’ fear of the Javanese’s dominance was made the greater by the 
latter’s preponderant influence in Indonesia’s political life during the 
authoritarian period,26 and by the fact that many Javanese migrate from 
the overpopulated island of Java to other islands. Christians, especially 
those who live in the Maluku Islands, in certain areas of Sulawesi and also 
in the Indonesian part of New Guinea, are especially fearful of dominance 
by the Javanese, most of whom are Muslim. The majority of Indonesia's 
Christians belong to small ethnic groups. 
Secondly, when the democratic changes began in 1998, 27  part of 
Indonesia’s political elite, especially Javanese, feared the country’s 
territorial disintegration and, more specifically, the secession of certain of 
its regions, as exemplified by East Timor’s official independence in 2002. 
Separatist tendencies in independent Indonesia were at one time very 
vivid and, to a lesser degree, continue to exist in the northern portions of 
Sumatra, in the province of Aceh (despite the signing in 2005 of a peace 
agreement between local separatists and the Indonesian authorities), 
which abounds in deposits of oil and natural gas, and in the Indonesian 
                                                          
24  Index Mundi, Indonesia Demographics Profile 2017: 
https://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/demographics_profile.html (accessed 12.10.2017). 
25  D.L. Horowitz, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 58. 
26  Horowitz (ibid., p. 59) notes that during the presidency of Suharto (who governed 
uninterruptedly from 1967 to 1998), the Javanese not only enjoyed key influence on the 
central government, but through the intermediary of retired Indonesian army officers, made 
up “the core of political control” beyond Java, on the so-called external Indonesian islands. 
27 The changes began with the resignation of president Suharto following a wave of popular 
protests in 1998, and with the first multi-party elections in 1999. 
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portion of New Guinea, in the provinces of Papua and West Papua, which 
have various natural resources such as gold, copper, silver, natural gas 
and wood.28 Both provinces and Aceh were given a special autonomous 
status29 that was fully implemented only in Aceh.30 
In addition, separatist currents were quite strong until recently in 
multi-ethnic Maluku, in the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago, in the 
present provinces of Maluku and North Maluku, where some ethnic 
groups are Muslim and some Christian. On several occasions, Maluku 
was the scene of bloody conflicts between followers of the two religions 
who were, at the same time, members of various ethnic groups. 
Aspirations to gain broad autonomy also emerged in the east-central part 
of Sumatra (in the regions of Riau, presently divided into two provinces 
– Riau and the Riau Archipelago), which has various natural resources 
and is inhabited in large measure by Malays, Bataks and Chinese; on the 
Minahasa Peninsula in north-eastern Sulawesi in the multi-ethnic 
province of North Sulawesi, whose population is in large measure 
Christian; and on the oil-rich island of Borneo, in the province of East 
Kalimantan, to which Indonesians of different ethnic backgrounds 
migrate. The provinces of Central Kalimantan (once part of East 
Kalimantan province) and West Kalimantan are periodically the scene of 
conflicts between the native Dayaks and Malay, and migrants from the 
island of Madura, the Madurese. 
As the above summary indicates, conditions in Indonesia make it 
possible for separatisms and for ethnic and communal conflicts to arise. 
The largest of them (in the Indonesian part of New Guinea and in Aceh) 
took place prior to the introduction of power-sharing. Conflicts of lesser 
intensity also took place at the beginning of the 21st century. At present, 
the intensity of separatist currents in Indonesia is low and ethnic and 
communal conflicts occur rarely.  
                                                          
28 The Indonesian, western portion of New Guinea, where the provinces of Papua and West 
Papua are located, used to be called Irian Barat (West Irian), Irian Jaya, and subsequently 
Papua. 
29 For more on separatisms and autonomy in Aceh and Indonesian Papua, see R. McGibbon, 
Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?, Washington 
DC: East-West Center, 2004. 
30 Krzysztof Trzciński, ‘The Consociational Addition to Indonesia’s Centripetalism as a 
Tactic of the Central Authorities: The Case of Papua’, Hemispheres, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2016, 
pp. 5–20: 
http://www.iksiopan.pl/images/czasopisma/hemispheres/HEMISPHERES_31-4_2016.pdf 
(accessed 18.10.2017). 
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3. The nature of the institution of the requirement for a spatial 
distribution of votes in presidential elections in Nigeria and Indonesia 
This part of the paper will concentrate on explaining the substance of 
the requirement for a spatial distribution of votes in presidential elections 
in Nigeria and Indonesia. In the case of Nigeria, differences between the 
country’s present constitution and the previous one will be discussed as 
they pertain to the requirement in question. 
 
3.1. Present Nigerian constitutional provisions  
In keeping with the Constitution of the so-called Fourth Republic from 
May 29, 1999,31 in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the president is both 
head of state and head of the government (art. 130 (2)). He is chosen in 
universal elections for a four-year term (art. 135 (2)). The same person 
can’t hold the office of president for more than two terms (art. 137 (1) 
(b)). A citizen of Nigeria can run for the office of president only if he is a 
member of one of the political parties active in the country, and if this 
party finances his candidacy (art. 131 (c)). 
The requirement for a spatial distribution of votes in presidential 
elections in Nigeria refers to states as the country’s basic units of 
territorial division (the Nigerian federation is presently made up of 36 
states) and to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja (art. 3 (1) and 
(4)), which is governed directly by the federal government. 
In keeping with the constitution of 1999, the requirement in question 
in the first round of presidential elections in Nigeria is applicable to three 
cases, which can arise in connection with different numbers of candidates 
for the office of president. Firstly, in the highly improbable case of there 
being only one candidate in the presidential election, to be duly elected 
he will have to win more positive (YES) votes than negative (NO) ones, 
and not less than 25% of positive votes cast in each of at least 2/3 of all 
federal states (counting the FCT) (art. 133 (a) and (b)). Secondly, in the 
case of there being two candidates in the presidential election, the winner 
will be the one who gains more than half of all votes, and no less than 
25% of votes cast in each of at least 2/3 of all states of the federation 
(counting the FCT) (art. 134 (1) (a) and (b)). Thirdly, in the situation that 
is most probable and most typical for Nigeria, when more than two 
candidates take part in presidential elections, the office of president will 
                                                          
31 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999: 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179202 (accessed 18.10.2017). 
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fall to the one who obtains the greatest number of votes and no less than 
25% of votes cast in at least 2/3 of all states of the federation (counting 
the FCT) (art. 134 (2) (a) and (b)).  
If no candidate manages to meet the requirements necessary to win the 
office of head of state, within 7 days from the announcement of the results 
of the election the Independent National Electoral Commission has to set 
the date for a second round (art. 134 (4)).  
The second round is open to two candidates from the first round: the 
one who won the greatest number of votes cast in the entire country and 
one of the remaining candidates (art. 134 (3) (a) and (b)). In keeping with 
the constitution, the second is not the candidate who won the second 
largest number of votes in the entire country, but the one who won the 
greatest number of votes in the largest number of Nigerian states (art. 134 
(3) (b)). This provision potentially strengthens the importance of the 
requirement for a spatial distribution of votes in presidential elections. 
Nonetheless, to continue with the subject of the candidate entitled to move 
on to the second round of elections as the second candidate, the Nigerian 
constitution also provides for a situation in which two candidates obtain 
a high number of votes in an identical number of states. In such a case, it 
entitles the one who has won the largest number of votes in the entire 
country to take part in the second round (art. 134 (3) (b)). 
The second round of presidential elections in Nigeria can, but doesn’t 
necessarily, lead to the election of the head of state. In keeping with the 
Constitution, for one of the candidates running in the second round to win 
the office of president, in addition to wining a simple majority of votes, 
he must win no less than 25% of votes cast in each of at least 2/3 of all 
states of the federation (with the FCT) (art. 134 (4) (a) and (b)). As a 
result, when the candidate who has won a simple majority of votes doesn’t 
meet the requirement for a spatial distribution of votes, within 7 days from 
the announcement of the results of the second round the Independent 
National Electoral Commission has to set the date for a third round.  
Both candidates taking part in the second round of the presidential 
elections in Nigeria also take part in the third round. The office of 
president will go to the one who wins a simple majority of votes cast (art. 
134 (5)). The Constitution of Nigeria waives the requirement for a spatial 
distribution of votes only in the third round of presidential elections. 
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3.2. Earlier Nigerian constitutional provisions  
In their majority, the provisions concerning the requirement for a 
spatial distribution of votes in presidential elections contained in the 
Nigerian Constitution of the so-called Fourth Republic from 1999 are 
identical to the provisions contained in the Constitution of the so-called 
Second Republic from 1979,32 in which the said requirement was used for 
the first time.33 
There is, however, a fundamental difference in the mode of procedure 
in cases when choosing the head of state proves impossible in either the 
first or second round of a general election. The 1999 Constitution 
prescribes in such a situation that a third round of general presidential 
elections be called, in which a spatial distribution of votes will not be 
required of the candidate who obtains a greater number of votes (art. 134 
(5)). In contrast, the 1979 Constitution did not provide for a third round 
of general elections in this situation. 
In keeping with its provisions, (art. 126 (4)), if the candidate who wins 
a simple majority of votes in the second round does not obtain the required 
spatial distribution of votes, the Independent National Electoral 
Commission will have to, within 7 days following the announcement of 
the results of the second round of presidential elections, set a date for the 
election of the president from among the two candidates, who competed 
with one another in the second round. But, in such a case, the election of 
the president is to be conducted by the members of both chambers of the 
federal House of the National Assembly and the parliament of each 
Nigerian state (House of Assembly of a State). 34  The candidate who 
obtains a simple majority of votes cast jointly in all legislative bodies will 
win the office of president. These provisions have never been tested in 
practice, however. 
                                                          
32 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1 October 1979 (enacted on 21 
September 1978): http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/nig_const_79.pdf (accessed 
18.10.2017). 
33 R. Benjamin, ‘Introduction’ in Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, 
Engineering, and Democratic Development, R. Benjamin and P. Nordlund (eds), Tokyo-
New York-Paris: United Nations University Press, 2008, p. 14. The so-called Second 
Republic of Nigeria fell with the military coup of 1983. Later attempts to establish the so-
called Third Republic in 1993 ended in failure. The Constitution of the Third Republic from 
1993 never fully came into force, and the military stayed in power in Nigeria from 1983 to 
1999. 
34 For more on this subject, see the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1 
October 1979…, art. 84–121. 
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3.3. Indonesian constitutional provisions  
The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia from 1945,35 following 
the introduction of the Third amendment of November 9, 2001 and the 
Fourth amendment of August 11, 2002,36 states that the president, elected 
in a general election (art. 6A (1)) for a five-year term (art. 7), is head of 
state and, at the same time, the head of the Indonesian government (art. 4 
(1) and art. 5). The same person can not occupy the office of president 
more than twice (art. 7). A candidate for president can be put forward by 
a political party or a coalition of political parties (art. 6A (2)).  
In order to be the winner in the first round of Indonesia’s presidential 
elections a candidate must obtain not only over 50% of the votes cast in 
the entire country but, at the same time, at least 20% of votes cast in more 
than half of all the country’s provinces (art. 6A (3)).37 Should none of the 
candidates manage to obtain such support, the two candidates who have 
won the greatest number of votes cast in the first round will pass on to the 
second round. The one of the two candidates who wins the greater number 
of votes in the second round will become head of state (art. 6A (4)). 
 
4. Final remarks 
In this part of the article paper I will discuss the present differences 
between the constitutional provisions in Nigeria and Indonesia as they 
relate to the requirement for a spatial distribution of votes cast in 
                                                          
35  The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia from 18 August 1945 (with later 
amendments): 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/id/id061en.pdf (accessed 20.10.2017). 
36 For more on the subject of these and other amendments to the Constitution of the Republic 
of Indonesia from 18 August 1945, see E. Schneier, The Role of Constitution-Building 
Processes in Democratization: Case Study – Indonesia: The Constitution-Building Process 
in Post-Suharto Indonesia, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, 2005: 
http://www.idea.int/cbp/upload/CBP_indonesia.pdf (accessed 22.10.2017); A. Ellis, 
Constitutional Reform in Indonesia: A Retrospective, March 2005:  
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/AEpaperCBPIndonesia.pdf (accessed 22.10.2017). 
Horowitz provides a synthesis of the events leading to the introduction of the requirement 
in question in Indonesia’s presidential elections in Constitutional Change and 
Democracy…, pp. 108–122. 
37 Discussions in Indonesia about the creation of additional provinces have been under way 
for several years, however. See, for example, S. R. Max, ‘How many provinces does 
Indonesia need?’, The Jakarta Post, April 20, 2012: 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/20/how-many-provinces-does-indonesia-
need.html (accessed 24.10.2017). 
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presidential elections. I will then attempt to address the question of 
whether the institution of the requirement in question has the effect of 
reducing the importance of conflictive behavior in relations between 
ethnic groups, i.e., whether it meets the goal for which it was established.  
 
4.1. Differences in the essence of the requirement in question in 
constitutional orders of Nigeria and Indonesia 
The provisions of the constitutions of Nigeria and Indonesia 
concerning the requirement for a spatial distribution of votes in 
presidential elections are in certain aspects different. Firstly, in the case 
of Indonesia the principles constituting the requirement in question are 
less complicated than in Nigeria, where three rounds of elections are 
theoretically possible, with the requirement in question being a part of the 
two first ones. In Indonesia, two rounds of elections can take place, but 
this requirement must be met only in the first round.  
Secondly, Nigeria and Indonesia have adopted somewhat different 
principles concerning levels of support – defined in percentage terms – 
which the victorious candidate needs to obtain in the country’s basic 
territorial division units (states or provinces) and their number. And so, in 
the case of Nigeria this level is a minimum of 25% of votes cast in each 
of at least 2/3 of all states of the federation (there were 36 states in 2017), 
with the FCT. These provisions are applicable in Nigeria to the first and, 
should the need arise, to the second round of presidential elections. In the 
case of Indonesia, this level was set at a minimum of 20% of votes cast in 
more than half of the country’s provinces (there were 34 of them in 2017).  
Taking into account the requisite number of rounds with the 
requirement, the minimal percentage of votes and the number of regions 
involved, it should be said that the principles of the requirement for a 
spatial distribution of votes in presidential elections are more stringent in 
Nigeria. But, although in both countries the requirement is accompanied 
by a requirement of obtaining majority support, which is typical for 
elections for a single-person office, in the case of Nigeria it is only a 
requirement to obtain a relative majority of votes, while in the case of 
Indonesia, it is an absolute majority.  
 
4.2. Does the institution of the requirement in question meet the goals 
for which it was established?  
An in-depth, especially a comparative, examination of the full 
consequences of the introduction of the requirement for a spatial 
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distribution of votes in presidential elections is not possible for the 
moment, mostly for the reason that this requirement has not functioned in 
democratic conditions for very long. 
In this context, the question that should be raised at the outset is 
whether the institution of the requirement for a spatial distribution of 
votes in presidential elections is democratic. It stands out from among the 
institutions typically found in liberal majoritarian democracies. This 
currently prevalent model of democracy usually precludes a situation in 
which the arithmetic victor of presidential elections, i.e., one who has 
obtained a majority of votes (a relative or absolute majority, depending 
on legal requirements in force) isn’t allowed to assume office,38 because 
the support he has obtained did not assume the appropriate spatial 
distribution in a specified majority of a given country’s regions. Yet in 
order to determine the democratic credentials of the requirement in 
question, the social acquiescence implied by its presence in the given 
country’s constitution should be sufficient. Were this not the case, it 
would be equally reasonable to question the fact that in long established 
western democracies, some of which are monarchies, the head of state is 
not even elected. The grounds for questioning the democratic nature of 
such an institution are certainly more solid than in the case of the 
requirement in question.  
Nevertheless, of the countries in which the requirement under 
examination exists, only in Indonesia is there a democratic regime. All 
the reports concerning the state of democracy in the world published thus 
far by the respected Economist Intelligence Unit (Democracy Indexes 
2006, 2008, 2010-2016) indicate that Indonesia is today considered to be 
– in keeping with the extensive criteria adopted by the authors of these 
reports – a democratic state, and specifically as a state with a flawed 
democratic regime. Similarly, D.L. Horowitz defines Indonesia as a low-
quality democracy,39 because, as he puts it, there remain areas of delayed 
development in that country.40 Among the most important of these, D.L 
Horowitz names four: the special status of the army (which continues to 
influence political life and whose violations of the law often go 
                                                          
38 Specific arrangements in this regard exist in the United States, but their character is 
different from that of the requirement in question. 
39 Horowitz, Constitutional Change and Democracy…, p. 207. 
40 Ibid., p. 209. 
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unpunished), an excess of corruption, a deficit of the rule of law and a 
high level of religious intolerance.41  
Since the Democracy Indexes were first published, in all its editions 
until 2014, Nigeria was classified as authoritarian state, and since 2015, 
as a state with a hybrid regime. This is the more significant as the 
democratic character of the presidential elections held in Nigeria before 
2015 was highly questionable, as were their results. 
Importantly, never has a favorite candidate in a presidential election 
in any country where a spatial distribution of votes in presidential 
elections is required not acceded to the office of president for failing to 
meet it. 
And so, in Nigeria under the rule of the Constitution of the so-called 
Fourth Republic from 1999, presidential elections took place in 2003, 
2007, 2011 and in 2015. According to official results, each time one of 
the candidates won in the first round and always obtained over 50% of 
votes cast, despite the fact that in that country, a candidate who simply 
obtained the greatest number of votes cast, i.e., who has won a relative 
majority, can win the elections if he meets the requirement for a spatial 
distribution of votes.42 It is considered that only the elections of 2015 have 
been conducted in keeping with democratic standards.43  
From 1979 to 1999, presidential elections were held four times. In 
1979 and in 1983 the leading candidate won the elections in the first round 
                                                          
41 For more on this subject, see Krzysztof Trzciński, ‘„Demokracja o niskiej jakości” (“low-
quality democracy”) – zasadność stosowania pojęcia i Horowitzowska egzemplifikacja na 
przykładzie Indonezji’ [‘”Low-Quality Democracy” – The Validity of the Concept and the 
Horowitz’s Exemplification: The Case of Indonesia’], Studia Polityczne [Political Studies], 
Vol. 44, No. 4, 2016, pp. 167–189. 
42 19 April 2003 Presidential Election, 21 April 2007 Presidential Election & 16 April 
2011 Presidential Election, in African Elections Database, Elections in Nigeria: 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html#2003_Presidential_Election (accessed 
26.10.2017); 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html#2007_Presidential_Election (accessed 
26.10.2017); 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng2007presidential.pdf (accessed 26.10.2017); 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html#2011_Presidential_Election (accessed  
26.10.2017). 
43  ‘Nigeria: Setting an Example?’ in The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 
2015: Democracy in an Age of Anxiety: 
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015 
(accessed 28.10.2017). 
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by obtaining a relative majority of votes,44 while in 1993 and 1999 the 
leading candidate also won the elections in the first round, but with an 
absolute majority of votes.45  
The situation in the imperfect Indonesian democratic system looks 
somewhat different. Following the introduction, in 2001-2002, to the 
Constitution of 1945 of the Third and Fourth amendments, the election of 
the president of Indonesia was conducted through universal suffrage three 
times – in 2004,46 in 2009,47 and in 2014.48 Only the 2004 elections had 
two rounds, and this was connected with the fact that the leading 
candidate did not obtain in the first round the required more than half of 
the votes cast in the entire country.  
Leaving aside the question of the degree to which the presidential 
elections in Nigeria and Indonesia are truly democratic, the above-
mentioned facts should not be interpreted as supporting the thesis that the 
requirement in question is of no practical significance. Quite the opposite, 
they suggest that the victorious candidates in elections are politicians 
whose views and acts, especially in matters that are sensitive for inter-
ethnic relations are moderate in character. Moderation in politics allows 
them to obtain a wider degree of support than that from their own ethnic 
group. What’s more, this moderation is characteristic for them during the 
exercise of their presidential authority and can lead to their re-election.  
Nigeria and Indonesia have presidential systems, of which the 
institution of vice-president is an inherent part. Given this, one can 
                                                          
44 11 August 1979 Presidential Election & 6 August 1983 Presidential Election, in African 
Elections Database, Elections in Nigeria: 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html#1979_Presidential_Election (accessed 
26.10.2017); http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html#1983_Presidential_Election 
(accessed 26.10.2017); http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng1983presidential.pdf (accessed 
26.10.2017). 
45 12 June 1993 Presidential Election & 27 February 1999 Presidential Election, in African 
Elections Database, Elections in Nigeria: 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html#1993_Presidential_Election (accessed 
26.10.2017); http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html#1999_Presidential_Election 
(accessed 26.10.2017). 
46 The Carter Center 2004 Indonesia Election Report, June 2005: 
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2161.pdf (accessed 28.10.2017). 
47 A. Ufen, ‘The Legislative and Presidential Elections in Indonesia in 2009’, Electoral 
Studies: An International Journal, No. 2, 2010, p. 284. 
48 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Final Results of the 2014 Presidential 
Election in Indonesia Announced, July 22, 2014: 
http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/News-in-Brief/2014/July/Final-Results-of-the-
2014-Presidential-Election-in-Indonesia-Announced.aspx (accessed 28.10.2017). 
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equally well conclude that, for example, the selection by a candidate in 
presidential elections of a partner for the office of vice-president of a 
different ethnic origin than his own could also have a positive effect on 
the electoral outcome.49 Such a situation has always been the case in 
Nigeria, and is frequent in Indonesia. In addition, in Nigeria the vice-
president is customarily of a different religion than that of the president.  
The requirement for a spatial distribution of votes in presidential 
elections is one of several centripetal institutions simultaneously 
functioning in Nigeria and Indonesia. Its role can not be justly appraised 
without taking into account the wider context of the long-term functioning 
of power-sharing type political systems in conditions of democracy, 
which accords such systems their legitimacy and makes them more 
transparent. In such a context, one can already say that the requirement in 
question could be important in the process of choosing moderate 
candidates for the offices of president and vice-president, and in the 
process of formulating such political programs that hold no preferences 
for specific ethnic groups, but whose character in conditions of a multi-
ethnic society is integrative. 
At this stage, there is still a lack of convincing evidence corroborating 
the thesis that the existence of the requirement for a spatial distribution of 
votes in presidential elections could help to stabilize the political situation 
and, especially, to reduce the importance of conflictive behaviour in 
relations between ethnic segments in Nigeria and Indonesia. Although it 
is true that the intensity of inter-segmental conflicts in those two countries 
in the beginning of the 21st century is lesser than in the 20th century,50 this 
fact cannot be attributed directly and solely to the application of the 
requirement in question. Many other factors can be just as influential in 
terms of reducing the importance of conflictive behaviour in relations 
between ethnic groups. Such factors may include the many other types of 
                                                          
49 For the example of Kenya, see The Results of the 2013 Kenyan Presidential Election, 
African Studies Center Leiden: http://www.ascleiden.nl/news/results-2013-kenyan-
presidential-election (accessed 28.10.2017). 
50 The opposite situation takes place in Kenya, where the requirement in question is also 
applied. 
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centripetal, but also consociational, power-sharing institutions that exist 
in both Nigeria,51 and Indonesia.52  
Intuition suggests, however, that D. L. Horowitz is right when he 
states that the requirement of a spatial distribution of votes in presidential 
elections is an example of a solution favoring less conflictive behaviour 
in mutual relations between politicians in multi-segmental societies, 
especially if this institution is accompanied by other ones introduced for 
the same purpose.
                                                          
51 For more on this subject, see Krzysztof Trzciński, ‘How Theoretically Opposite Models 
of Interethnic Power-Sharing Can Complement Each Other and Contribute to Political 
Stabilization: The Case of Nigeria’, Politeja, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2016, pp. 53–73: 
 http://www.akademicka.pl/ebooks/free/c3b7109ec2dbc4b3834ccd59bc1d59d3.pdf 
(accessed 28.10.2017). 
52 For more on this subject, see Krzysztof Trzciński, ‘Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia’, 
Polish Political Science Yearbook, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2017, pp. 168–185: 
http://www.marszalek.com.pl/yearbook/docs/46-1/ppsy2017111.pdf (accessed 
28.10.2017). 
